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Structured Abstract 
 
Purpose: This paper analyses the nature and impact of budgetary responses to the pandemic in the 
context of the strengths and weaknesses of UK public sector financial management. 
Design / Methodology / Approach: The analysis is developed through consideration of four 
modes of government accounting. Data are drawn from multiple official sources, which report 
actual and forecast government receipts and expenditures as the crisis unfolds. 
Findings: There have been dramatic effects on UK government finances. Government receipts 
have fallen by 12% and expenditures have increased by 36% in the first three months of the crisis 
(April-June 2020), compared to the previous year. Government debt increased to £1,984 billion 
(99.6% of GDP), the highest percentage since March 1961 (ONS, 2020c). The pandemic will have 
the greatest impact on UK public finances in 2020-21, with a record budget deficit which, under 
the OBR (2020c) central scenario, may approach £322 billion and increase public sector net debt 
to £2,205 billion (104.1% of GDP). 	
Research Limitations / Implications: The research is necessarily limited by the impact of the 
pandemic and the Government’s responses in a rapidly changing social, economic and fiscal 
environment. 
Practical Implications: Statistical accounting and budgeting dominate attention because of 
reporting speed and issues of international comparability. The pandemic has emphasised the 
importance of timeliness. Government financial reporting is marginalised, though this should not 
be permanent if the pandemic retreats. Fiscal sustainability analysis will warn that UK public 
finances are even more unsustainable than before the pandemic. 
Social Implications: The interaction of higher levels of debt and future increases in interest rates 
might result in a new era of austerity and further centralisation of public power and economic 
decision-making in one of the world’s most centralised democracies. 
Originality / Value: The paper provides an early, structured analysis of the impact of the 
COVID-19 emergency on UK government finances. 
 
1: Introduction 
The UK has been severely affected by the COVID-19 pandemic. It has reported one of the highest 
rates of per capita ‘excess deaths’ in Europe (ONS, 2020a) and suffered a record fall in its GDP of 
over 20.4% in the quarter ending 30 June 2020 (ONS, 2020b), greater than any of the EU27 
(European Commission, 2020) and G7 countries (OECD, 2020a). Deeper analysis of causes and 
government response will no doubt be examined in the inevitable post-pandemic Public Inquiry. 
There have been dramatic effects on UK public sector finances because of emergency 
expenditures and falling revenues. UK public sector net debt increased to £1,984 billion (99.6% of 
GDP) at 30 June 2020, the highest percentage since March 1961 (ONS, 2020c). 
The objective of this paper is to understand the nature and impact of budgetary responses to the 
pandemic in the context of the strengths and weaknesses of UK public sector financial 
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management. The analysis is developed through consideration of the four modes of government 
accounting: (i) financial reporting, (ii) statistical accounting, (iii) budgeting, and (iv) fiscal 
sustainability reporting (Heald and Hodges, 2018).  
Section 2 considers the underlying strengths and weaknesses of UK public sector financial 
management at the start of the COVID-19 emergency. Section 3 describes and analyses the UK 
Government’s budgetary responses. Section 4 considers the potential consequences, financial and 
political, of the crisis, and Section 5 draws the analysis to its conclusion.   
2: Strengths and Weaknesses of UK Public Sector Financial Management 
It is 25 years since the UK Treasury (1995) committed to accruals accounting and budgeting 
across the public sector, in a White Paper devised by the accounting academic Andrew Likierman, 
then the Treasury’s Chief Accountancy Adviser.  
The subsequent technical achievement is impressive. UK government financial reports (the first 
mode of government accounting), originally linked to UK GAAP, closely follow IFRS as 
mediated for the public sector by the Financial Reporting Advisory Board to HM Treasury. With 
some relatively small exceptions, these arrangements bring consistency between tiers of 
government and the category of public entity. This involved harmonisation of separate traditions: 
central government cash basis, local government loans fund accounting, NHS partial accruals, and 
full accruals in arm’s-length public bodies. Moreover, the devolved administrations established in 
Scotland and Wales and restored in Northern Ireland in 1999 were willingly incorporated into the 
reforms. The conversion to accruals was implemented for the financial year 2000-01, though the 
full consolidation ‘Whole of Government Accounts’ (WGA) was not published until financial 
year 2009-10. This provides a clear reconciliation between IFRS-based financial reporting and 
statistical accounts (the second mode of government accounting) based on the European System of 
Accounts 2010 (ESA10). Financial reporting and budgeting have been aligned, as foreseen in 
1995, on the same accruals basis, which is internationally unusual. The UK’s multi-year Spending 
Review system (budgeting, the third mode of government accounting) has provided policy control 
and enjoys a high international reputation. In the early 2000s the Treasury pioneered fiscal 
sustainability analysis (the fourth mode of government accounting) (Eich, 2008), calculating fiscal 
gaps for 50 years ahead: later this was taken up by the Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR), 
the UK’s independent fiscal council.  
These positive features have gained the UK high scores on most indexes of comparative fiscal 




Though remaining IFRS-based, the similarity between IFRS and IPSAS results in the UK being 
one of the most IPSAS-consistent European countries.   
Yet there were serious grounds for concern even before the COVID-19 pandemic inflicted 
unprecedented damage on UK public finances. The technical achievement in government 
financial reporting was never matched by user engagement, a point emphasised in the Public 
Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee’s (2017) report on the democratic uses of 
government accounts. The UK practice of approving the Estimates four months into the financial 
year rendered the Parliament’s Supply procedure irrelevant to financial management practice, 
while maintaining constitutional symbolism (Procedure Committee, 2017). The remote possibility 
of meaningful reform increasing the role of Parliament vanished when the minority Conservative 
Government won a decisive majority in the December 2019 general election which was 
dominated by ‘Brexit’ (UK exit from the EU).  
Executive-dominated budgeting via irregularly-timed multi-year Spending Reviews has drawn 
attention away from government financial reporting. Ferry and Eckersley (2011, p. 15) observed 
that “Budgeting has become the great issue of our time”, after austerity was imposed through 
Spending Reviews which had earlier managed rapid public expenditure growth. Nevertheless, 
governments retained annual flexibility within overall expenditure totals (Ferry and Eckersley, 
2012).  
Delays in WGA publication have reduced the relevance of financial reporting to policy 
formulation, though the WGA has been valuable as input to the OBR’s fiscal sustainability 
projections. The earlier speeding-up of publication of the WGA was halted by the non-availability 
of quasi-privatised academy schools’ data that delayed the 2014-15 Department for Education 
accounts. The 2017-18 WGA reporting lag was 14.0 months, never having recovered to the 12.0 
months achieved for 2013-14 (Treasury, 2020c). After nine years of WGA publication, the 
reporting lag is still much longer than the Treasury’s medium-term target of 9.0 months 
(Comptroller and Auditor General, 2019, para. 1.8 on p. 197). The publication of the 2018-19 
WGA in July 2020 was delayed by the COVID-19 crisis, resulting in a reporting lag of 15.7 
months. Such delays reduce the usefulness of the WGA and reinforce the policy focus on 
statistical accounting numbers published monthly by the Office for National Statistics (ONS).  
The beneficial effects of technical achievements have been weakened by the temptations to 
manipulate financial information for short-term political advantage. More fiscal transparency only 




public attitudes to fiscal numbers (Heald, 2018). UK examples include the pre-IFRS treatment of 
most Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) as off-balance sheet in government financial reports 
(Hodges and Mellett, 2012); the continuing post-IFRS treatment of most PPPs outside of ESA-
based budgeting numbers in order to keep down the net debt ratio; and the placing of activities 
outside the general government boundary (e.g. Network Rail until September 2014 and that part 
of student loans estimated not to be recoverable until a December 2018 decision by the ONS). 
‘Cheating at the margin’, whether by classifications to avoid breaking the 1998 sustainable 
investment rule (40% of GDP ceiling on net public debt) by using private finance for public 
investment even when not value-for-money, or by redefining the economic cycle to meet the 
golden rule (over the cycle borrowing should only be used for capital expenditure), had limited 
macro-fiscal effect, but intensified public cynicism. 
Furthermore, these developments have taken place in a political climate that since the 2008 global 
financial crisis has been dominated by, first, austerity (Heald and Hodges, 2015) and second, 
Brexit (Jozepa et al., 2020). After the 2010 election resulted in no party having an overall 
majority, the 2010-15 Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition pinned the political blame for 
fiscal deficits on the alleged profligacy of the 1997-2010 Labour Government. It also invoked 
‘expansionary fiscal consolidation’ (Alesina and Ardagna, 2009) in support of fiscal retrenchment, 
concentrating almost exclusively on spending cuts rather than a balance with taxation increases. 
This narrative of austerity was sustained through the 2015 General Election, at which the 
Conservative Party won a small overall majority. Brexit then took over the political agenda when 
Prime Minister David Cameron called and lost the 2016 referendum on EU membership. His 
successor, Theresa May, called another General Election in 2017 to strengthen her parliamentary 
position over Brexit, but lost her majority and, though supported by the pro-Brexit Democratic 
Unionist Party (Northern Ireland), failed to secure parliamentary approval for Brexit and officially 
resigned in July 2019. After months of conflict with the House of Commons, her successor, Boris 
Johnson, won a decisive Conservative majority of 80 in the December 2019 General Election.  
Some features of this political climate are salient coming up to the COVID-19 pandemic. Periods 
of UK austerity over the preceding century had relatively short durations of two to three years 
(Hood and Himaz, 2017), whereas the post-2010 ‘fiscal squeeze’ has already lasted for ten years. 
During this period, many of the previous Labour Government’s New Public Management-inspired 
performance management systems were abandoned, with central policy enforced by hard 
constraints on public expenditure, including deep cuts in local government expenditure.[1] The 




p. 18), as it did to devolved administrations and those public bodies which were not abolished. By 
2017 the Treasury, concerned that systems designed to achieve ‘value-for-money’ had been 
subordinated to successful downward pressure on expenditure, commissioned the Barber (2017) 
review of ‘public value’, and was considering what its implementation involved before the 
COVID-19 pandemic struck. 
The UK has exhibited problems of political culture, some of which are legacy effects and others 
emerging developments. The UK’s General Government Expenditure/GDP ratio in 2018 was 
40.9%, significantly below that of France (55.6%) and Germany (45.2%) (OECD, 2020b), yet 
there is a continuing expectation of Scandinavian-style public services at US tax rates. The 
historical tradition of fiscal centralisation has been partly challenged by devolution to Scotland, 
Wales and Northern Ireland, yet austerity in the 2010s led to intensified centralisation in England, 
with its local authorities rendered financially vulnerable and operationally less capable. The 
residential property tax (‘council tax’), which is local authorities’ main source of own revenue, is 
still based on 1991 property values in England and Scotland, despite massive shifts since then of 
regional house prices. Constitutional issues (Scottish independence and the future of Northern 
Ireland), external relations (particularly Brexit) and media-driven populism are the dominant 
features of UK political life. The UK left the EU de jure on 31 January 2020, but practical 
arrangements will not change until 31 December 2020 which, being the end of the negotiated 
transition period, is de facto Brexit. The economic and fiscal effects of Brexit will be submerged 
in the larger damage from COVID-19 and from the public health response to it. 
3: UK Budgetary Responses to COVID-19 
The OBR’s (2018) pre-COVID-19 fiscal projections showed that UK public finances were 
unsustainable: on unchanged policies, the UK net public debt ratio would reach 283% of GDP in 








Figure 1 shows UK government receipts, expenditures and net debt from 1996-97 to 2019-20, 
before the major fiscal impacts of the pandemic took effect (OBR, 2020a). 
Receipts and expenditures were broadly in balance up to 2000-01. A period of increasing public 
expenditure followed up to 2008 without concurrent increases in taxation receipts. This caused an 
increase in public sector net debt, though it remained below the Labour Government’s self-
imposed limit of 40% of GDP. The financial crisis of 2008 changed that, with rapidly increasing 
public expenditure to save the UK financial system and provide welfare benefits, resulting in 
public sector net debt approaching 70% of GDP by March 2011. The period of austerity was 
marked by reducing levels of expenditure, while taxes and other government receipts were 
maintained at about 37% of GDP from 2010 to 2020. The annual deficit was reduced but never 
eliminated. Public sector net debt stayed above 80% of (an increasing) GDP from 2015 onwards. 
The sharp increase in 2019-20 represents the early impact of COVID-19 emergency measures.    
COVID-19 Fiscal Response 
The UK Government’s response to the COVID-19 crisis has seen dramatic economic 
interventions, greater than any similar measures since the Second World War. Major features of 
these budgetary responses are discussed below. Unlike the US, which has stressed payments to 
households and not to firms, UK policy has been designed to maintain the connection between 
employees and firms. The longer-term implications of these measures are considered in Section 4. 
The main spending measures cover protection of income for both employed and self-employed 
persons, grants and loans to businesses, and extensive use of government guarantees. A break-








First, in terms of scope and scale of expenditure, is the Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme (CJRS) 
designed to avoid, or at least delay, employee redundancies. The scheme provides government 
funding of 80% of employees’ pay up to a maximum of £2,500 a month for each worker. 
Introduced on 20 March 2020, it was based upon employees being absent from all work, though 
later modified to allow part-time working. Employers were encouraged, but not required, to make 
up the other 20% of pay to those employees ‘furloughed’ under the scheme. The CJRS has been 
popular and successful in avoiding redundancies, though at large cost to the public finances. It is 
estimated that around 9.6 million workers will be furloughed under the scheme at a cost of £57.7 
billion (OBR, 2020b). There was disquiet that the CJRS did not apply to those individuals who are 
self-employed; in the UK this includes many on low incomes forced into self-employment in the 
‘gig’ economy. On 26 March, the government announced the Self-Employment Income Support 
Scheme (SEISS) which provided a taxable grant of 80% of average monthly profit of up to £2,500 
per month for those whose self-employment income was the majority of their total income. This 
has been taken up by 2.7 million individuals, at an estimated cost in 2020-21 of £15.2 billion 
(OBR 2020b). Despite the CJRS and SEISS, there was still an increase in the number of people 
claiming unemployment benefits of 1.4 million between March and July 2020 (ONS, 2020d).    
Second, a series of grant and loan schemes for businesses has been implemented. The major loan 
schemes, all with full or partial government guarantees, are the Coronavirus Business Interruption 
Loan Scheme (CBILS) with loans of up to £5 million, later extended for higher amounts to larger 
businesses (CLBILS), together with a Bounce Back Loan Scheme (BBLS), aimed at smaller 
businesses, providing loans of up to £50,000 or 25% of annual turnover. These three schemes, 
together with some bespoke loans, have assisted over 1.13 million businesses with loans of £45.8 
billion (OBR, 2020b). Additionally, the COVID-19 Corporate Financing Facility (CCFF) supports 
the Bank of England in the purchase of the short-term unsecured debt of large companies, with 
£18.3 billion outstanding at 8 July (OBR, 2020b).  
There are a Small Business Grant Fund and a Retail, Hospitality and Leisure Business Grant Fund 
which provide grants of either £10,000 or £25,000 for many small businesses and charities. Grants 
of £14.8 billion are expected to be paid during 2020-21 (OBR, 2020b). Other items are shown in 
Figure 2. ‘Direct Support for Households’ relates to the effect of increasing Universal Credit 
entitlements and housing allowances. ‘Other Business Support’ relates mainly to payments for 
trade credit insurance. ‘Public Services Spending’ of £58.9 billion is the estimate of additional 
spending by the National Health Service, local authorities, transport authorities etc., including 




administrations (Treasury, 2020a). ‘VAT & Income Tax Deferrals’ of £50.0 billion are the 
estimates of the amounts due but deferred to later periods. ‘Business Rates Relief’ refers to the 
deferral of this business property tax in 2020-21. ‘Other taxation measures’ relates mainly to 
temporary reductions of VAT in the hospitality and tourism sectors (from 20% to 5%) and of 
Stamp Duty Land Tax (a tax on property transactions) to support the housing market (Treasury, 
2020a).  
The losses that will arise from loans that are not repaid or from guarantees crystallising to further 
damage the financial position of the public sector depend upon many uncertain future events 
(Heald and Hodges, 2018). The OBR (2020c, p. 68) includes a provision of £16.9 billion in its 
2020-21 central scenario,[2] based upon a 10% default rate for CLBILS and CBILS and a 40% 
default rate for BBLS, for part of each loan portfolio. The data in Figure 2 are on a cash 
commitment basis, including loans that have been advanced, but not losses on loans or from 
guarantees that may crystallise in future years. 
COVID-19 Income Reductions 
The costs of deferring various taxes are included in Figure 2. Another significant element 
contributing to future budget deficits will be the reductions in revenue from taxes and duties. 
These include lower VAT receipts due to reduced economic activity; lower receipts from user 
charges for public facilities; and lower taxes on income as a result of higher unemployment and 
reduced profits. The OBR (2020c) has estimated this reduction of income in 2020-21 to be over 
£130 billion.  
Actual and Projected Public Sector Deficits and Net Debt  
The OBR’s latest Fiscal Sustainability Report (2020c) estimated a deficit of £57 billion (2.6% of 
GDP) in 2019-20, a substantial figure, though less than any year between 2008-09 and 2015-16, 
which were all above 4% of GDP. Public sector net debt was expected to rise to £1,806 billion 
(88.5% of GDP) by 31 March 2020. The pandemic will have the greatest impact on UK public 
finances in 2020-21, with a record budget deficit which, under the OBR (2020c) central scenario, 
may approach £322 billion and increase public sector net debt to £2,205 billion (104.1% of GDP). 
In the longer term, fiscal projections indicate that the threat of non-sustainability in UK public 
finances will be worsened by the effects of the pandemic and the policy response to it. The OBR 
(2020c) central scenario projects public sector net debt of 418% of GDP in 2069-70. 
Figures for government receipts and payments are provided monthly by the ONS (2020c). The 




immediate fiscal impact of the pandemic and the associated government measures. Receipts have 
fallen by 12% and expenditures have increased by 36% compared to the same period of the 
previous year. The net result is that the deficit of £127.9 billion is over five times that recorded in 
2019-20. This deficit contributed towards public sector net debt increasing to over £1,983 billion 
(96.9% of GDP) at the end of June 2020. 
Table 1: Preliminary UK Government Receipts and Expenditures for April-June 2020 
Source: Adapted from ONS (2020c). 
 
4: Potential Consequences 
 
Consideration of the potential consequences of the global pandemic should be cautious, given the 
massive uncertainties involved. Moreover, the UK trajectory cannot be separated from the legacy 
effects of the 2008 global financial crisis, impending de facto Brexit on 31 December 2020, and 
the deterioration in international relations. However, it is possible to identify major issues facing 
the UK.  
First, as summarised above, the hits to GDP and the public finances are unprecedented. The UK 
has an unusually long public debt structure, with a wholesale average debt maturity of 15.3 years 
at 31 December 2019 (Treasury, 2020b, Table A.1) which, together with high market liquidity, 
has enabled the UK Government to issue huge amounts of new debt. Many other countries are 
more constrained. Even if GDP did recover quickly and economic scarring were limited, the 
pandemic-induced deficits will continue to increase the debt/GDP percentage. The medium-term 
consequences would derive from higher debt servicing costs resulting from higher interest rates or 
from a loss of market confidence.  
This raises the question as to how the policy response will be paid for. UK experience in the 
2010s suggests that current expressions of “We are all in this together” are not convincing. There 
is discussion in the media of turning towards a renewal of society based upon equality and 
fairness, as a result of the vivid differentiation of pandemic costs according to gender, generation, 
 Receipts Expenditure Net Deficit 
 2019 Change 2020 2019 Change 2020 2019 Change 2020 
 £bn £bn £bn £bn £bn £bn £bn £bn £bn 
April 66.8 -8.7 58.1 77.7 29.0 106.7 10.9 37.7 48.6 
May 61.6 -6.2 55.4 67.4 31.9 99.3 5.8 38.1 43.9 
June 65.5 -9.9 55.6 72.7 18.3 91.0 7.2 28.2 35.4 




ethnicity, occupation and income. However, no major political party in the UK has been willing to 
risk votes by admitting that broad-based tax increases are necessary to help both reconstruct 
public services and reduce public borrowing, not just heavier taxation of ‘the rich’. The revenue 
from taxes that have been reduced (property transfer taxes) or deferred (Business Rates) or both 
(VAT) is unlikely to be fully restored within the next few years. At the same time, pressure has 
built up for more spending on, inter alia, ‘green’ and IT infrastructure, housing and the National 
Health Service. 
Second, the overwhelming pressure has been to “get the money out quick” in order to support the 
economy and alleviate suffering. For macroeconomic purposes, the fact that it landed was more 
important at the height of the crisis than whether it was well-targeted. The UK public sector has a 
relatively good record, internationally, in terms of fraud limitation. However, the nature of the 
schemes and the haste with which IT systems had to be developed must have increased fraud risk. 
The SEISS scheme might be less vulnerable because the tax authority (Her Majesty’s Revenue & 
Customs) could use self-employment tax returns from earlier years. How much fraud there has 
been will be a major issue for public audit bodies, together with potential future risks given that 
weaker checks will have exposed system vulnerabilities. The National Fraud Initiative, which 
performs electronic data checking across the records held by many public bodies, will provide 
some ex post protection, though recoveries are likely to be difficult. Another fraud risk relates to 
the business loan schemes, with government guarantees. Even when everything has been 
legitimate, many of these loans will never be repaid in full because of default or future 
forgiveness; the OBR (2020c, p. 68) assumes a 40% default rate on part of the BBLS loan 
portfolio. The threat of non-repayment will add to public sector deficits and debt as a result of 
write-offs and provisioning as well as increasing contingent liabilities (Heald and Hodges, 2018).  
Third, accounting and budgetary arrangements do not cause either austerity or centralisation, but 
they may facilitate them, by making the finances of all public sector bodies transparent to the 
political centre, through the multi-year Spending Review system and by centralised control of the 
major revenue-generating taxes. Indeed, the austerity drive in the UK during the 2010s was an 
impressive managerial achievement, putting the burden of adjustment almost entirely on 
expenditure reduction, as ministers wished to do. State-size reduction was supported by appeal to 
expansionary fiscal consolidation. However, this austerity programme lost sight of value-for-
money (performance management systems were rolled back), of the macroeconomic damage to 
economic recovery (fiscal consolidation came too early in the recovery), and of the social 




referendum vote for Brexit). Neither the three devolved governments (Scotland, Wales and 
Northern Ireland) nor local authorities have borrowing powers that can bridge the collapse of 
revenue and sudden increases in expenditure resulting directly and indirectly from the pandemic. 
Only the UK Government can borrow to meet these circumstances. This might result in further 
fiscal centralisation in what is already one of the world’s most fiscally centralised democracies. 
Fourth, there has been a strong focus on tracking cash, echoing IMF Managing Director Kristalina 
Georgieva’s (2020) injunction to “spend as much as you can, but keep the receipts”. The Treasury 
relaxed the administrative deadline for 2019-20 departmental accounts from three to six months, 
while holding the legislative deadline at ten months. To reduce burdens on finance functions, the 
2020-21 planned implementation of IFRS16 (lease accounting) was cancelled. The lockdown will 
have slowed accounts preparation and prevented certain audit tasks from being undertaken. If the 
pandemic retreats relatively quickly, the damage to the financial reporting mode will be limited.  
Fifth, the Chancellor of the Exchequer (Rishi Sunak) plans to announce the results of the 2020 
Spending Review in Autumn 2020. The Conservative Government’s secure majority suggests that 
the period might cover four financial years (2021-22 to 2024-25), covering the period up to the 
general election expected in 2024. This would resemble the 2010 Spending Review (secure 
Coalition majority for the period), a political context unlike that of the 2015 Spending Review 
(the minority partner in the Coalition restricted it to one year) and the one-year-ahead 2019 
Spending Round (minority Conservative Government unable to secure House of Commons’ 
assent to Brexit legislation). However, Spending Review 2020 is being conducted amidst 
unprecedented uncertainty about the long-term effects of COVID-19 and Brexit on the economy 
and public finances, thereby making it likely there will be later budgeting adjustments. 
Sixth, the post-pandemic recovery could be both weak and slow. Leaving aside the debt surge, 
bringing revenue and expenditure close to balance will be difficult. Statements by UK ministers 
have ruled out a return to the austerity of the 2010s, but that is not convincing given the historical 
record. There has been appetite for large spending increases (infrastructure programmes proposed 
before the crisis), but none for higher taxation in future to pay for that. Tax increases imposed too 
early would choke off the recovery, and there is also the political context of Conservative Party 
election commitments not to increase income tax, National Insurance Contributions or VAT. 
Heald and Hood (2014, p. 7) attributed ‘fairly high’ political consequences (“imposition of visible 
and salient losses”) to explicit breaking of key election promises on taxes and expenditure. 
Whether the UK electorate will accept that “this time is different”, due to the unexpectedness and 




will be profoundly difficult, even assuming much higher levels of public debt become politically 
acceptable and financially sustainable. 
5: Conclusion 
This analysis has identified tensions in the UK’s response to the pandemic. In terms of the 
tensions between modes of government accounting, the primacy of budgeting and statistical 
accounting has been further strengthened. In the UK, the Executive exercises fiscal initiative with 
minimal substantive legislative constraints. Statistical accounting dominates attention because of 
reporting speed and issues of international comparability and the market credibility of 
government. Financial reporting is marginalised, though valuable as a data resource and for 
assurance about how public money has been spent. Delays to IFRS-based accounts will have to be 
accepted and such delays may increase unless the pandemic retreats. Fiscal sustainability analysis 
warns that UK public finances are even more unsustainable than before the pandemic, increasing 
concerns about the effects of a future return of the pandemic and a worsening climate change 
crisis.  
There are also strategic public policy tensions that have fiscal implications. These include those 
between (a) two facets of public well-being (health and economy) and the management of their 
interdependence and (b) national, devolved and local responses in both public health and financial 
support. The emphasis in the early months of the pandemic on health protection appears to have 
given ground to an emphasis on economic recovery, not least to help pay for the vast increase in 
public borrowing. The interaction of higher levels of public sector net debt and future increases in 
interest rates might result in a new era of austerity and further centralisation of public power and 
economic decision-making in one of the world’s most centralised democracies.  
The UK’s future political direction is unknown, particularly whether there will permanently be 
‘more government’ or whether antagonism towards government will intensify. The economic 
consequences depend on how much lasting damage is done to the real economy, particularly if 
premature and haphazard relaxation of lockdown leads to future waves of infection. There has 
been much media talk of a trade-off between public health and economic damage, but further 
waves of COVID-19 due to public health laxity would lead to deeper scarring of productive 
capacity. For most economies these will be challenges enough; for the UK they will compound 
the hollowing out of state capacity by a decade of public expenditure austerity and the yet 





1. Comparisons are difficult to make because UK public expenditure statistics give priority to consistent 
functional analysis over analysis by tier of government. Harris et al. (2019, Figure 3.2) calculated that 
aggregate local authority spending in England fell by 21% in real terms (adjusted by the GDP deflator) 
from 2009-10 to 2017-18 while population growth resulted in per capita spending falling by 25%. These 
data exclude spending on education, national parks, police, and fire and rescue services because transfers 
of responsibilities lead to non-comparability.	
2. OBR (2020c) provides forecasts based upon a central scenario, together with a more optimistic upside 
scenario and a more pessimistic downside scenario. The central scenario assumes that output regains its 
pre-virus level by the end of 2022. 
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